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ABSTRACT   Since the end of the Great Recession in mid-2009, the unem-
ployment rate has recovered slowly, falling by only 1 percentage point from 
its peak by September 2011. We find that the lackluster labor market recovery 
can be traced in large part to weakness in aggregate demand; only a small part 
seems attributable to increases in labor market frictions. This continued labor 
market weakness has led to the highest level of long-term unemployment in the 
postwar period and a blurring of the distinction between unemployment and 
nonparticipation in the labor force. We show that flows from nonparticipation 
to unemployment are important for understanding recent changes in the dura-
tion distribution of unemployment. Simulations that account for these flows 
suggest that the labor market is unlikely to be subject to high levels of struc-
tural long-term unemployment after aggregate demand recovers.
in the Spring 2010 volume of the Brookings Papers, we provided an analysis of U.S. labor market developments in the most recent recession 
(Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin 2010). We documented that, from the perspective 
of a wide range of labor market outcomes, the 2007–09 recession caused 
the deepest labor market downturn in the postwar era. Here we update that 
earlier work and provide new analyses and results regarding the extent and 
persistence of long-term unemployment in the aftermath of the recession.
Section I provides a summary update of our original work, focusing on 
indicators of labor market adjustment such as the Okun’s Law relationship 
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and the Beveridge curve. We also discuss recent research regarding the 
implications of these indicators for the extent of structural unemployment 
and conclude that it appears to be limited. Section II extends our earlier 
analyses by describing a set of new facts about unemployment inflows and 
outflows, which determine the path of the unemployment rate and its dura-
tion distribution. We document a sharp increase since the beginning of 
the recession in the incidence of measured monthly inflows to unemploy-
ment at reported durations that substantially exceed 1 month. These inflows 
appear to reflect a rising tendency for respondents to report the elapsed 
time since they first started searching rather than continuous periods spent 
in active search. On the basis of this more complete characterization of net 
flows, in section III we update the simulation of unemployment dynamics 
presented in Elsby and others (2010). The results indicate that long-term 
unemployment will largely dissipate if exit rates for the short-term unem-
ployed recover, reinforcing our conclusion that the current extent of struc-
tural unemployment is quite limited.
I. Update on Labor Market Adjustment
As we documented in Elsby and others (2010), the labor market down-
turn that accompanied the 2007–09 recession was the most severe of the 
postwar era, and the subsequent recovery has been tentative and uneven. 
The most adversely affected groups include men in general as well as 
younger workers, less educated workers, and workers belonging to ethnic 
minorities. Starting in early 2010, labor market conditions have begun to 
recover slowly. The unemployment rate, which peaked at 10.1 percent, fell 
to 9.0 percent as of September 2011, still 4.6 percentage points above its 
prerecession low. Of the groups that experienced larger increases in their 
unemployment rates during the recession, most—including men, younger 
workers, and Hispanics—have since seen relatively larger declines in their 
unemployment rates (table 1).1
Elsby and others (2010) showed that the nature of labor market adjust-
ment until mid-2009 displayed a notable resemblance to that observed in 
past severe downturns. Starting in 2009, however, indicators of real activ-
ity and the labor market began to diverge from past patterns. We summa-
1. In table 1 the labeled “recession” period corresponds to the incidence of rising unem-
ployment rather than the National Bureau of Economic Research’s recession dating. Two 
important exceptions to the patterns noted in the text are workers with less than a high 
school education and black workers. Workers without a high school diploma saw only a 
0.8-percentage-point decline in their unemployment rate after a huge, 8.3-percentage-point 
rise during the recession. And following its initial surge, the unemployment rate of black 
workers has increased further, by 0.2 percentage point.
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rized this divergence in the context of Okun’s Law and the Beveridge curve 
and concluded that labor market conditions were weaker than implied by 
historical relationships between real activity and the labor market. Since 
then, however, official data for both GDP and the job openings rate for the 
recession period have been revised downward. In addition, the recovery in 
GDP and job openings slowed considerably in the first half of 2011, while 
the unemployment rate fell by about a percentage point. These develop-
ments brought the Okun’s Law relationship in line with historical observa-
tions and narrowed the divergence in the Beveridge curve relationship (see 
figures A1 and A2 in the accompanying web appendix).2
Even though measures of real activity and of the labor market are now 
better aligned than they were in late 2009, recent observations on unem-
ployment and job vacancies imply a rightward shift in the Beveridge 
curve of around 2.7 percentage points (figure A3 in the online appendix). 
2. Online appendixes for papers in this volume can be accessed at the Brookings Papers 
website, www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea.aspx, under “Past Editions.”
Table 1. changes in Unemployment rates by sex, age, education, and race, 2007–11
Change (percentage points)
Group
Prerecession level 
(2007Q2, percent)
Recession 
(2007Q2–2009Q4)
Recovery 
(2009Q4–2011Q3)
All workers  4.5 5.4 -0.8
Sex
  Male  4.6 6.5 -1.6
  Female  4.4 4.3 -0.2
Age
  16–24 10.3 8.7 -1.6
  25–54  3.6 5.3 -0.8
  55 and over  3.1 3.9 -0.3
Education
  Less than high  
    school diploma
 6.8 8.3 -0.8
  High school  4.2 6.5 -1.2
  Some college  3.5 5.3 -0.5
  College degree or  
    higher
 2.0 2.8 -0.5
Race or ethnicity
  White  4.0 5.2 -1.2
  Black  8.4 7.6   0.2
  Hispanic  5.6 7.2 -1.5
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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A search-and-matching model that incorporates incentives for vacancy 
creation indicates that this rightward shift is consistent with an increase 
in the natural rate of unemployment of about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points 
(see Barnichon and others 2010 and Daly and others forthcoming). This 
shift and the implied increase in the natural rate have been interpreted by 
us and others as evidence of the growing importance of structural factors 
in the persistently high unemployment rate (see, for example, Kocher-
lakota 2010). In Elsby and others (2010) we identified some potential 
causes of this deviation and evaluated three factors: skill mismatch, geo-
graphic mismatch arising from house lock (unwillingness or inability to 
sell one’s home in a weak housing market), and emergency unemployment 
compensation.
Since early 2010, a substantial amount of research has addressed the 
quantitative importance of these channels. Our view, which is informed 
by reviewing the recent literature as well as some of our own work, can be 
summarized as follows:
—Skill mismatch likely has contributed about 1 percentage point to 
the increase in the unemployment rate, with estimates ranging from about 
0.25 to 1.75 percentage points (Barnichon and Figura 2011, Estevão and 
Tsounta 2011, Daly and others forthcoming, S¸ahin and others 2011). How-
ever, available evidence suggests that the increase in unemployment that 
can be attributed to skill mismatch is not structural. The paper by S¸ahin and 
others studies a range of measures of mismatch, which reveal imbalances 
between vacancy and unemployment shares across sectors and occu-
pations. Although these measures rose from 2007 until the end of the 
recession in mid-2009, they have declined significantly since then, sug-
gesting that the impact of mismatch will largely disappear as the recov-
ery proceeds. This pattern is consistent with dispersion in the sensitivity 
of sectoral activity to aggregate demand fluctuations (see, for example, 
Abraham and Katz 1986), but further research is needed to study the deep 
causes of mismatch.
—The role of geographic mismatch and the house-lock mechanism 
has been quantitatively negligible (Daly and others forthcoming, Molloy, 
Smith, and Wozniak 2010, S¸ahin and others 2011, Valletta 2010). The 
observation that the interstate migration rate declined during the reces-
sion was cited by some as motivating evidence for the importance of 
geographic mismatch. However, Greg Kaplan and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl 
(2010) have shown that the significant drop reported in the annual inter-
state migration rate between 2005 and 2006 in the Current Population 
Survey was a statistical artifact arising from the procedure that the Census 
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Bureau used to handle missing data. The corrected data show that inter-
state migration has been trending downward for many years. Relative to 
that trend, there was no additional decrease in interstate migration during 
December 2007 to June 2009.
—Recent research has shown that emergency unemployment compensa-
tion (EUC) has likely had an impact on the natural rate of unemployment. 
Although estimates range from 0.3 to 3 percentage points, most studies find 
an effect of around 1 percentage point or less (see Aaronson, Mazumder, 
and Schecter 2010, Farber and Valletta 2011, Fujita 2011, Nakajima 2011, 
Rothstein, this volume, and Valletta and Kuang 2010).
To summarize, recent research indicates that skill mismatch and EUC 
have contributed to the deviation in the Beveridge curve. However, because 
this deviation has occurred at very low levels of vacancies, it is difficult to 
separate shifts in the curve that reflect an increase in matching frictions 
from short-term cyclical adjustments back toward the curve’s initial posi-
tion; at low vacancies, along the flat portion of the curve, small increases 
in vacancies imply a large deviation from the prior position of the curve. 
The evidence cited above suggests that the cyclical component has been 
much more important than the increase in frictions, and that the latter will 
dissipate as the labor market recovery progresses and the EUC extensions 
expire and are not renewed.
The continued weakness of the labor market thus appears mainly to be 
due to the continued shortfall in aggregate demand. The modest recovery 
in labor demand has been too weak to generate a substantial decline in the 
unemployment rate.
An ongoing development that appears at odds with our claim of limited 
matching frictions is the rise in long-term unemployment to record levels; 
the problem has intensified rather than improved during the 2 years since 
the recession ended. This can be seen from figure 1, which breaks the aggre-
gate unemployment rate series down into six duration groups. As of July 
2011, 4 percent of the labor force reported that they had been unemployed 
for more than 6 months, with about three-quarters of those unemployed for 
more than a year. The extent and persistence of long-term unemployment 
raises the concern that the United States might develop a long-term unem-
ployment problem of the type that many European countries experienced 
after the severe recessions of the 1970s and 1980s (referred to as “Euro-
sclerosis”). However, in the next two sections we provide new evidence, 
based on an updated and extended analysis of net unemployment flows and 
simulations of the resulting unemployment dynamics, indicating that the 
risk of “Amerisclerosis” is small.
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II. Unemployment Inflows and Outflows Reconsidered
In Elsby and others (2010) we used a labor market flows framework to 
discuss trends in the labor market during the Great Recession. A first clue 
to the potential sources of recent developments in the unemployment rate 
can be gleaned from an anomaly that has emerged in the behavior of two 
leading measures of these unemployment flows.
The first measure constructs flow transition probabilities from the lon-
gitudinally matched individual-level data in the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). For example, the unemployment-to-employment transition prob-
ability can be estimated using these data by computing the fraction of the 
unemployed in a month who report that they are employed in the follow-
ing month’s survey. Estimates of these aggregate transition probabilities 
for 1990 onward are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 
2008), and pre-1990 estimates have been made available by Robert Shimer 
(2007). A drawback of these estimated flows is that they appear to con-
tain a large number of spurious transitions, especially between unemploy-
Figure 1. Unemployment rate by Duration, january 1994–july 2011a
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, and authors’ calculations. 
a. Seasonally adjusted monthly observations. Shaded columns indicate recessions. 
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ment and nonparticipation (see Poterba and Summers 1995 and references 
therein for a discussion).
A second measure of labor market flows can be inferred from the 
reported duration structure of unemployment (Perry 1972, Shimer 2007). 
This measure estimates the outflow rate from unemployment using cross-
sectional data on the stock of unemployed workers, ut,  and the number 
unemployed for less than 5 weeks, ut<5w, rather than longitudinal microdata 
on the flows. Using these data, Shimer (2007) computes the unemployment 
outflow hazard according to
( ) ln ln .1 1 15f u u ut t t w t= - -( ) - ( )[ ]+ +<
Shimer’s outflow hazard can be interpreted as follows. First, one calcu-
lates the fraction of those unemployed this month who are still unemployed 
the next month. If all inflows into unemployment consist of persons who 
report a duration of unemployment shorter than 5 weeks, then this fraction 
equals the number of persons unemployed next month, ut+1, minus those 
unemployed next month with a duration of unemployment shorter than 
5 weeks, ut<+15w, expressed as a fraction of the number of currently unemployed, 
ut. Second, one transforms this 1-month unemployment “survival” rate into 
a continuous-time outflow hazard. This is the unemployment outflow mea-
sure that we used for the majority of the analysis in Elsby and others (2010).
Figure 2 displays Shimer’s estimate of the outflow hazard together with 
the unemployment-to-employment transition rate, where each is plotted as 
a logarithmic deviation from its respective historical mean. As we noted 
in our original paper, historically these two measures have moved very 
closely together over the business cycle. Toward the end of the recession 
in mid-2009, however, a discrepancy emerged between the two series: 
Shimer’s measure exhibited a much larger cyclical downturn than the 
unemployment-to-employment transition rate.
What might account for this anomaly? A natural candidate is suggested 
by the observation that Shimer’s outflow hazard ft captures not only flows 
from unemployment to employment due to people finding jobs, but also 
flows from unemployment into nonparticipation. Thus, one might think that 
the recent deviation in figure 2 reflects a decline in the number of unem-
ployed dropping out of the labor force relative to those finding jobs. In fact, 
the opposite turns out to be the case. Figure 3 reveals that the flow transi-
tion rate from unemployment to nonparticipation has actually increased 
since the end of the recession, while that to employment has basically been 
flat. Far from deepening the observed cyclical downturn in the estimated 
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outflow hazard, this would tend to attenuate its cyclical amplitude relative 
to the unemployment-to-employment transition rate.
What turns out to be driving the discrepancy is that the outflow haz-
ard is calculated under the natural assumption that everyone who flows 
into unemployment in a month reports a duration of unemployment of 
5 weeks or less. This assumption is not borne out by the data. To see this, 
consider figure 4, which shows inflows into unemployment by reported dura-
tion as a share of the labor force. Historically, there have always been some 
inflows into unemployment at reported durations of 5 weeks or longer. Since 
the start of 2010, however, these inflows have increased in size and now 
make up about half of the flows into unemployment. A quarter of the total 
inflows now report durations of at least 6 months. Although in principle these 
flows should not exist, the reason they appear in the CPS can be traced to 
the way the survey records unemployment duration. In particular, nothing 
Figure 2. shimer’s outflow hazard and the Unemployment-to-employment transition 
Probability, 1967–2011a
Unemployment-to-
employment
transition
probabilityb
Shimer’s outflow
hazardc
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Sources: Shimer (2007); tabulations by Joe Ritter using CPS microdata provided by Hoyt Bleakley; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
a. Quarterly averages of monthly data. Shading indicates recessions. 
b. Percent of unemployed persons flowing into employment, from CPS gross flows.
c. Unemployment outflow hazard calculated using equation 1 in the text.
Log deviation from mean
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in the survey ensures that those who report that they are unemployed today, 
but who were not classified as unemployed in the previous month’s survey, 
report a duration of unemployment of less than 5 weeks. As a result of 
these long-duration inflows, total inflows into unemployment exceed u t<+15w 
in the longitudinally matched data, particularly since 2010. Consequently, 
Shimer’s estimate of the outflow hazard has shown more of a cyclical 
decline than the outflow probabilities calculated based on BLS (2008).3
There are a number of potential interpretations of this phenomenon. A 
natural candidate is that it reflects random measurement errors, either in 
labor force status, unemployment duration, or both (Poterba and Summers 
1995). Applying this interpretation, however, requires ignoring the clear 
3. By the same token, the measure of the inflow rate into unemployment proposed by 
Shimer (2007), and used by us in Elsby and others (2010), also misses these long-duration 
inflows into unemployment, since it is also based on the number unemployed for less than 5 
weeks. Consistent with this, figure A4 in the online appendix shows that this measure of the 
inflow rate has reverted completely to its prerecession level.
Figure 3. Probabilities of transition from Unemployment to employment and  
to nonparticipation, 1967–2011a
To employment
To nonparticipation
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Sources: Shimer (2007); tabulations by Joe Ritter using CPS microdata provided by Hoyt Bleakley; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations.
a. Three-month moving averages of seasonally adjusted monthly data. Shading indicates recessions. 
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cyclical pattern reflected in the recent sharp increase in these flows. The 
cyclical pattern suggests that these inflows may reflect something economi-
cally more meaningful about the labor market decisions of CPS respon-
dents than just measurement error. A detailed analysis of who makes up 
these inflows at long durations is beyond the scope of this update, but a 
couple of points are worth noting.
First, whereas approximately 60 percent of the inflows into unemploy-
ment at reported durations longer than 1 month originate from nonpar-
ticipation, only 25 percent of the inflows with duration less than 1 month 
originate from nonparticipation. These figures suggest that the majority of 
the long-duration inflows into unemployment are individuals who stopped 
looking for work for some months and then started looking again in the 
survey month.4 When asked how long they have been looking for a job, it 
is quite plausible that they would report how long it has been since they 
initially started looking, rather than when they resumed their search. Like-
4. This is also consistent with the observation that nonparticipants have continued to 
flow into unemployment at an increasing rate since the end of the recession. See figure A5 
in the online appendix.
Figure 4. Duration composition of inflows into Unemploymenta
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, and authors’ calculations.
a. Seasonally adjusted monthly observations. Shaded columns indicate recessions.
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wise, employment-to-unemployment flows at long durations are possible 
for individuals who took on a temporary or part-time job and continued 
looking for a better job while working.
Thus, one interpretation of these long-duration inflows is that they rep-
resent individuals who would like to work more but are not able to find jobs 
to their liking. Under this interpretation, for those flowing in from employ-
ment, the lack of jobs has led them to commit to a temporary solution while 
continuing to seek better opportunities, whereas for those flowing in from 
nonparticipation, the lack of jobs has reduced their search effort. The latter 
group could be reasonably considered as behaving as marginally attached 
to the labor force.
This brings us to the second aspect of these long-duration inflows that 
is worth noting. The vast majority of those flowing in from nonparticipa-
tion and reporting durations in excess of 1 month were not classified as 
marginally attached when they were out of the labor force. As noted above, 
the increased incidence of these long-duration inflows since the recession 
ended suggests that this pattern does not solely reflect random measurement 
error, but instead reflects periodic reentry by individuals who are loosely 
attached to the labor market. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests 
that alternative measures of unemployment that include the marginally 
attached, such as the BLS’s U5 and U6 measures, have been understating 
the actual amount of labor underutilization since the recession ended.
The pattern of inflows into unemployment at reported durations exceed-
ing 1 month that we have uncovered is not only important for understanding 
the anomalies that have recently emerged in estimates of unemployment 
flows, but indeed essential for understanding the dynamics of the dura-
tion distribution of unemployment and thus the dynamics of the long-term 
unemployment rate. We turn to this issue in the next section.
III. Long-Term Unemployment: Amerisclerosis?
In Elsby and others (2010) we presented a simulation of the future path of 
the aggregate outflow rate that accounted for flow rates out of unemploy-
ment that vary substantially by duration. That simulation did not account 
for the inflows at long durations that have become increasingly prominent 
since then.5 Because these inflows raise measured unemployment dura-
tions, ignoring them makes it very difficult to match the right tail of the 
5. Other recent analyses that examine the duration distribution of unemployment and dura-
tion dependence in exit rates either do not account for the duration structure of inflows (for exam-
ple, Hornstein 2011) or only partially account for them (for example, Rothstein, this volume).
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unemployment duration distribution. Although the emphasis in our simula-
tion was not on the duration distribution, it substantially underpredicts the 
number unemployed at durations of 6 months or longer in the data.
In order to simulate accurately the dynamics of the measured dura-
tion structure of unemployment, then, one needs to take into account both 
inflows and outflows into unemployment at all durations. Figure 4 has 
already summarized the duration structure of inflows into unemployment. 
Figure 5 plots estimates of outflow rates from unemployment by duration 
and destination (employment or nonparticipation) based on CPS microdata 
for the period from July 2010 through June 2011.
Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that it is very difficult for the long-
term unemployed to find a job.6 Yet despite the recent severity of long-
6. Catherine Rampell (“The Help-Wanted Sign Comes with a Frustrating Asterisk,” New 
York Times, July 25, 2011), for example, discusses the phenomenon of job ads that explicitly 
require candidates to be “currently employed” or “recently unemployed.” This anecdotal evi-
dence provides support for theories of unemployment dynamics in which applicants are ranked 
based on their unemployment duration (see, for example, Blanchard and Diamond 1994).
Figure 5. Probabilities of transition from Unemployment to employment and 
to nonparticipation, by Unemployment Duration, july 2010–june 2011a
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Sources: Current Population Survey and authors’ calculations.
a. Average for all unemployed workers observed in the matched monthly samples during the period, by 
indicated duration.
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term unemployment, job finding rates among the long-term unemployed 
(defined as those with durations exceeding 6 months) remain sufficiently 
high that most will find work within several months to a year. Figure 5 
shows that each month an average of nearly 11 percent of the long-term 
unemployed find a job. Although this rate of job finding represents a his-
torical low for the United States, it is slightly higher than the outflow 
rate of the French unemployed, averaged across the complete duration 
distribution as well as across expansions and recessions (Hobijn and S¸ahin 
2009). At this rate, about half of the long-term unemployed in the United 
States will find a job within 6 months, and three-fourths will find a job 
within 1 year.
Figure 5 also reveals that although job finding rates for the long-
term unemployed are much lower than for the short-term unemployed, 
they change little as duration lengthens beyond 6 months. The job find-
ing rate for the very long term unemployed, those with durations of 
18 months and higher, is not much lower than for those with durations 
of 6 to 18 months.
The dynamics of the unemployment duration distribution are determined 
by the net outflow rates from unemployment (outflows, from figure 5, net 
of inflows, from figure 4) within different duration ranges. For example, 
the net outflow rate during a given quarter for durations of 1 to 3 months 
is given by the share of those unemployed for 1 to 3 months who have not 
exited unemployment by the next quarter:7
( ) .2 11 3 14 6 1 3f u ut m t m t m- +- -= - ( )
The calculation of these net outflows is quite simple, since it involves only 
counting unemployed individuals by duration range and thus does not 
require the use of longitudinally matched CPS data. This approach assumes 
that the reported durations are correct, which is appropriate for an exercise 
aimed at reproducing the duration distribution.8
To consider how persistent the long-term unemployment problem in the 
United States might be, in table 2 we use these flow rates to construct 
three simulated paths of the unemployment rate. All three paths start with 
7. For the rest of our analysis we use quarterly data, because some of the monthly data 
turn out to be very noisy. The duration ranges we consider are 1 to 3, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, 10 to 12, 
13 to 15, 16 to 18, and more than 18 months.
8. All net outflow rates, except that for durations of 16 to 18 months, are lower in the 
most recent 4 quarters than before the recession. For some duration ranges, net outflow rates 
are negative, indicating that inflows exceed outflows.
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the average duration structure of unemployment and the unemployment 
rate observed in the most recent data, those for 2011Q2. The first path, 
“2010–11,” is simulated under the assumption that the net outflow rates 
will remain at the levels that prevailed in the most recent 4 quarters of data. 
The second path, “Expansion,” is simulated under the assumption that net 
outflow rates return immediately to the levels that prevailed during the 
preceding expansion, covering 2004Q1–2007Q1.
Of greatest interest is the final path in table 2, labeled “Structural unem-
ployment.” This reports results of a counterfactual experiment that provides 
some perspective on the possible effects of a recovery in labor demand 
for the short-term unemployed only. We assume here that both inflows 
into unemployment and the net outflow rates of the short-term unem-
ployed (those with duration less than 6 months) return to their average in 
the 2004–07 expansion. The demand for long-term unemployed workers, 
however, is assumed not to recover—their net outflow rates remain at their 
2010–11 levels. This counterfactual simulation corresponds to a scenario 
in which the long-term unemployed are essentially stuck at their existing, 
depressed rates of exit from unemployment, consistent with the notion that 
Table 2. simulated Paths of the Unemployment rate and the long-term  
Unemployment rate
Simulation
Quarter 2010–11a Expansionb
Structural  
unemploymentc
Unemployment rate
  2013Q4 9.4 5.3 6.3
  2014Q4 9.5 5.2 6.1
  2015Q4 9.5 5.1 6.0
  Long run 9.5 5.0 5.9
Long-term unemployment rated
  2013Q4 4.4 1.4 2.4
  2014Q4 4.4 1.2 2.2
  2015Q4 4.4 1.2 2.1
  Long run 4.4 1.1 1.9
Sources: Authors’ calculations.
a. Net outflow rates from unemployment are assumed to remain at the average level that prevailed 
during 2010Q3–2011Q2.
b. Net outflow rates are assumed to return immediately to the average level that prevailed during 
2004Q1–2007Q1.
c. Inflows into unemployment and the net outflow rate of the short-term (less than 6 months) unem-
ployed are assumed to return to their 2004Q1–2007Q1 average, but net outflow rates for the long-term 
unemployed remain at their 2010Q3–2011Q2 average.
d. Persons unemployed for 6 months or longer as a percent of the labor force.
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their current status reflects structural unemployment that will not dissipate 
as aggregate labor demand recovers.
Table 2 reports the three paths for the unemployment rate and the 
long-term unemployment rate obtained from these simulations. The 
“long-run” values correspond to the implied flow-steady-state outcomes; 
the unemployment rates listed for prior years converge quickly to the 
steady-state values. As can be seen from the table, the net outflow rates 
observed over the past 4 quarters imply a steady-state unemployment 
rate of 9.5 percent, slightly above that in 2011Q2. Since this “2010–
11” scenario suggests that the labor market is approximately in its flow 
steady state, it implies that the long-term unemployment rate will barely 
budge going forward.
If instead the inflow and net outflow rates were to return instantaneously 
to their 2004–07 expansion levels, the unemployment rate would drop rap-
idly to below 6 percent in mid-2012 and 5.1 percent at the end of 2015 and 
converge to 5.0 percent. Interestingly, the last figure corresponds to a lead-
ing current estimate of the prerecession natural rate (Congressional Budget 
Office 2011). Under this scenario, the long-term unemployment rate drops 
rapidly to 1.2 percent, which is 0.2 percentage point above its average over 
the 2004–07 labor market expansion.
It is the “Structural unemployment” exercise, however, that is most 
informative regarding the factors that are likely to shape the recovery 
of the labor market. In this scenario in which net outflow rates remain 
unchanged for the long-term unemployed, the unemployment rate falls 
steeply to 6.0 percent by the end of 2015 and ultimately converges to 
5.9 percent—a rate that falls within the range for the natural rate recently 
estimated by Daly and others (forthcoming). The relatively modest increase 
in the steady-state unemployment rate relative to its values in the 2004–07 
expansion emphasizes the critical role of improvement in outflow rates for 
the short-term unemployed for lowering the overall unemployment rate. 
Strikingly, even though the structural unemployment scenario assumes no 
improvement in demand for the long-term unemployed, their unemploy-
ment rate falls to 1.9 percent, less than half of its value implied by current 
unemployment flows.
This exercise highlights two important lessons for the recovery of the 
labor market. First, a very effective way to prevent a long-term unem-
ployment problem is to improve the likelihood that individuals find a job 
before they become long-term unemployed. Second, even in the context of 
the very depressed labor market conditions of recent years, the long-term 
unemployed are nonetheless finding jobs at a sufficient rate that a stimulus 
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to the prospects of the short-term unemployed would fuel a rapid and near-
complete recovery in the labor market as a whole.9
IV. Conclusion
Since our original paper, many other studies have confirmed that there is 
little evidence that increases in labor market frictions due to mismatch or 
the effects of the temporary extensions of unemployment compensation 
can account for a large part of the continued elevated level of unemploy-
ment. Instead, downward revisions of data on economic activity released 
since our original analysis suggest that the labor market weakness is more 
in line with overall economic slack than we initially thought.
Because of this continued weakness, a record number of the unemployed 
now report that they have been looking for a job for 6 months or longer. 
Recently measured unemployment durations have been propped up to an 
unusual degree by inflows to unemployment at reported durations exceed-
ing 1 month. These inflows are typically ignored in the existing literature 
on unemployment duration dynamics but are essential to understanding the 
current environment. In addition, we find that during the last year, over 10 
percent of the long-term unemployed have found jobs each month, but this 
pace has not been rapid enough to reduce reported durations in the presence 
of the long-duration inflows.
We have used this information on the inflow and outflow rates at differ-
ent durations to simulate the path of the unemployment rate under alterna-
tive scenarios for net outflow rates. We find that even if exit rates for the 
long-term unemployed do not rise above their recent depressed values, an 
increase in exit rates for the short-term unemployed to their prerecession 
levels will substantially reduce the long-term unemployment rate. Hence, 
we interpret the current flow dynamics of the U.S. labor market as indicat-
ing a low risk that the labor market will suffer a bout of Amerisclerosis, 
or persistently elevated long-term unemployment, even in the wake of the 
most severe recession in postwar history.
9. This insight regarding the overwhelming importance of exit rates for the short-term 
unemployed is not new. For example, Nickell (1997) emphasizes this point when he dis-
cusses the importance of active labor market policies to aid the unemployed in European 
countries that did not suffer much from Eurosclerosis. Of course, active labor market policies 
are only one policy option to improve labor market outcomes of the short-term unemployed. 
Other types of stimulus might have a similar effect.
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Comment and Discussion
COMMENT BY
BETSEY STEVENSON and ANDREW LANGAN Michael Elsby, Bart 
Hobijn, Ays¸egül S¸ahin, and Robert Valletta have provided a superb update 
to earlier research by the first three authors documenting the worst labor 
market downturn since the Great Depression. In their original Brookings 
Paper (Elsby and others 2010), they showed that the Great Recession was 
significantly deeper than other postwar recessions and that the magnitude 
of the labor market downturn was even larger than would have been pre-
dicted given the decline in GDP. They also found that despite the unusual 
depth of this recession, the demographic composition of the labor mar-
ket adjustment was similar to that in past recessions—contrary to claims 
in the popular press of a “mancession” and an “unprecedented” rise in 
 unemployment among white-collar workers.1 Moreover, they found that 
the pattern of inflows and outflows early in the downturn was typical of that 
in past recessions, with a sharp rise in unemployment inflows from layoffs 
followed by a large decline in unemployment outflows, which in this epi-
sode reached a postwar low. However, they argued that the sustained high 
un employment rates in late 2009 and early 2010—attributable to contin-
ued low outflows from unemployment—suggested a shift of the Beveridge 
curve and a new, higher natural rate of unemployment.
In this update of that 2010 Brookings Paper, Elsby and his coauthors 
show, first, that subsequent data revisions have altered views of the Great 
Recession. The decline in GDP was much greater than previously thought, 
and hence the large deterioration in labor market conditions was more in 
1. See, for example, Derek Thompson, “It’s Not Just a Recession. It’s a Mancession!” 
The Atlantic, July 9, 2009, and Patrick McGeehan, “This Time, Slump Hits Well-Educated, 
Too,” The New York Times, April 4, 2009. 
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line with Okun’s Law. Data revisions also shrank the perceived shift of 
the Beveridge curve, which had partly reflected an inflated estimate of 
vacancies.
Second, the authors marshal evidence suggesting that housing market 
malaise, skills mismatch, and relatively generous unemployment insur-
ance benefits are unlikely to lead to persistently higher unemployment, and 
thus there is little evidence of structural unemployment problems. Third, 
they revisit the labor market flow data to see what has changed. In doing 
so, they uncover new puzzles in the data, reflecting the fact that employ-
ment status and unemployment duration are self-reported. After account-
ing for these puzzles, the authors update the simulation of unemployment 
dynamics presented in the earlier work, finding that the U.S. labor market is 
unlikely to suffer from the persistently high long-term unemployment rates 
that dogged Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, the authors examine 
the recent labor market experiences of different demographic groups, find-
ing that those groups that suffered the largest increase in unemployment 
have subsequently experienced relatively larger declines in unemployment. 
In all, the authors are quite optimistic about the future prospects of the U.S. 
labor market.
In this comment we will seek to temper this optimism by highlighting 
some of the areas of potential concern for the labor market going forward. 
The first of these is the challenge of correctly assessing the job prospects 
of the unemployed, given the problems the authors identify with the unem-
ployment duration data. The second area of concern involves changes in 
labor force participation. The authors highlight declines in unemployment, 
but employment-to-population ratios show that the labor market had yet 
to begin its recovery in the period they examine. This affects the authors’ 
simulation results as well, as they do not assume that labor force participa-
tion rates return to their prerecession levels, but do assume that transitions 
out of the labor force continue at either current or prerecessionary levels; 
thus, part of the fall in long-term unemployment in their expansion scenario 
comes as people stop looking for work. A third concern is the fact that 
some groups—women, older workers, and blacks—have had a particularly 
hard time in this recovery, as is evident both in employment-to-population 
ratios and in labor market flows broken down by demographic characteris-
tics. A fourth is that public sector budget cuts are causing ongoing public 
sector job loss. A final concern has to do with job mobility. In their discus-
sion of geographic mismatch of jobs with workers, the authors, like others, 
focus only on the housing market. It may be that geographic mismatch is 
playing a role, but that the relevant frictions are family dynamics and the 
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challenges faced by dual-career couples. Too little research has considered 
the coordination issues inherent in job mobility among couples. We will 
elaborate on each of these points in turn.
measuring unemployment duration and assessing reemployment The 
authors’ analysis of the longitudinal aspect of the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) yields a finding that is also reported by Jesse Rothstein in this 
volume: the month-to-month flow data appear to be overstating the amount 
of churn in the labor market and do not generate the unemployment dura-
tions observed in the monthly cross section. To understand this problem, 
one needs to start with the definitions of unemployment and unemploy-
ment duration: the unemployed are those who are available for, and actively 
seeking, work; unemployment duration measures the length of time that 
people spend continuously in this state. The assumption that most econo-
mists make when working with the data is that people respond to the CPS 
in a manner consistent with these definitions. Perhaps more important, they 
assume that people’s responses do not systematically deviate from these 
definitions in a way that is correlated with the business cycle. Yet the authors 
find that, in the wake of the recent recession, a larger share of respondents’ 
reported durations of unemployment deviate from the official definition. A 
substantial number of the newly unemployed report unemployment dura-
tions of over 5 weeks, despite having reported in the preceding month’s 
interview that they were employed or out of the labor force. Many of them 
even report durations of over 6 months, thus adding themselves to standard 
measures of long-term unemployment. This finding adds a new dimension 
to understanding the unprecedented rise in unemployment duration. More 
generally, it reminds us that the borders between labor market statuses are 
fuzzier than our definitions imply.
This measurement problem can also lead analysts to overstate the 
chances that the long-term unemployed will find stable employment. For 
instance, the authors calculate the month-to-month flows from unem-
ployment to employment using the longitudinal aspect of the CPS and 
conclude that “three-fourths [of the long-term unemployed] will find a 
job within 1 year.” However, their analysis suggests that this estimate 
includes a lot of spurious or temporary employment spells that disappear 
by the next month, and they therefore use flows calculated from the cross 
section in conducting their simulations. These data suggest that perhaps 
only about 35 to 40 percent of the long-term unemployed exit to employ-
ment within a year. The longitudinal data also provide another perspective 
when examined over a longer time frame: among those CPS respon-
dents who reported being unemployed in the fall of 2010, only around 
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 40  percent reported being currently employed 1 year later, and even fewer 
of those who were long-term unemployed in the fall of 2010 were work-
ing a year later. Although this exercise is subject to many  caveats—not 
all people can be matched 12 months later, and those who report being 
unemployed in both periods may have had, and then subsequently lost, 
employment over the course of the intervening year—the results show 
that the job prospects of the unemployed are far worse than the monthly 
flow estimates suggest.
Falling labor Force participation with no improvement in  employment 
The primary importance of flows out of low-duration unemployment for 
determining steady-state unemployment rates is part of the reason that 
Elsby and his coauthors (2010) concluded that there was little likelihood 
of a Eurosclerosis-like problem in the United States. However, their 
 analysis does not preclude the emergence of a large segment of the popula-
tion dropping out of the labor force. In all recessions, labor force partici-
pation declines, and the recent recession and its aftermath have been no 
exception. Our table 1 shows that the labor force participation rate fell 1.1 
percentage points during the recession and that it declined an additional 0.8 
percentage point between 2009Q4 and 2011Q2. Participation continued to 
decline by another 0.1 percentage point in the second half of 2011.
These declines in the labor force are largely responsible for the decline 
in the unemployment rate during the recovery through 2011Q2. Meanwhile 
the employment-to-population ratio fell 4.6 percentage points during the 
recession and another 0.1 percentage point in the same recovery period. 
Although unemployment started to decline following its October 2009 
peak, the employment-to-population ratio remained at its recession low in 
2011Q3. Since then it has recovered slightly, rising 0.3 percentage point 
above its recession low by the end of 2011 and by another 0.3 percentage 
point in January 2012.2 These rates show that the labor market began to 
turn around only in 2011Q4. Thus, unemployment fell in the period ana-
lyzed by the authors only because labor force participation fell. More gen-
erally, the prospects for labor force recovery are a function of both labor 
force participation trends and unemployment.
ongoing challenges For some demographic groups The employment-
to-population ratios in table 1 also show pronounced differences in labor 
2. The reported employment-to-population ratio was unchanged between December and 
January as the January 2012 rate reflected a reweighting of the population to take into account 
the 2010 census findings. This reweighting lowered the employment-to-population ratio 
by 0.3 percentage point as the population was found to be older than previously estimated.
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
es
, e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t-t
o-
po
pu
la
tio
n 
r
at
io
s,
 a
nd
 l
ab
or
 F
or
ce
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
r
at
es
 b
y 
d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 g
ro
up
a
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t-t
o-
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
ra
tio
La
bo
r f
or
ce
 
 
 pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
ra
te
G
ro
up
Re
ce
ss
io
nb
Re
co
ve
ry
c
Re
ce
ss
io
nb
Re
co
ve
ry
c
Re
ce
ss
io
nb
Re
co
ve
ry
c
A
ll
5.
4
–
0.
8
–
4.
6
–
0.
1
–
1.
1
–
0.
8
Se
x
 
 
M
al
e
6.
5
–
1.
5
–
6.
4
0.
3
–
1.
9
–
0.
9
 
 
Fe
m
al
e
4.
3
–
0.
2
–
2.
8
–
0.
5
–
0.
4
–
0.
6
A
ge
 
 
16
–2
4
8.
7
–
1.
6
–
8.
2
0.
2
–
3.
7
–
0.
9
 
 
25
–5
4
5.
3
–
0.
8
–
5.
1
0.
2
–
0.
6
–
0.
6
 
 
≥5
5
4.
0
–
0.
4
–
0.
2
0.
5
1.
4
0.
4
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(ag
e ≥
 
25
 o
nl
y)
 
 
Le
ss
 th
an
 h
ig
h 
sc
ho
ol
8.
3
–
0.
6
–
3.
2
–
0.
5
0.
7
–
0.
9
 
 
H
ig
h 
sc
ho
ol
6.
5
–
1.
0
–
5.
0
–
0.
6
–
1.
0
–
1.
3
 
 
So
m
e 
co
lle
ge
5.
3
–
0.
8
–
5.
5
–
0.
2
–
1.
9
–
0.
9
 
 
Co
lle
ge
 o
r h
ig
he
r
2.
9
–
0.
4
–
2.
8
0.
0
–
0.
6
–
0.
3
R
ac
e 
or
 e
th
ni
ci
ty
 
 
W
hi
te
5.
1
–
1.
0
–
4.
3
0.
0
–
0.
9
–
0.
8
 
 
B
la
ck
7.
7
0.
2
–
6.
2
–
0.
7
–
1.
6
–
0.
7
 
 
H
isp
an
ic
7.
2
–
1.
1
–
6.
0
–
0.
3
–
1.
2
–
1.
1
So
ur
ce
: C
ur
re
nt
 P
op
ul
at
io
n 
Su
rv
ey
.
a.
 A
ll 
un
de
rly
in
g 
m
ea
su
re
s a
re
 se
as
on
al
ly
 a
dju
ste
d.
b.
 C
ha
ng
e 
is 
fro
m
 2
00
7Q
2 t
o 2
00
9Q
4.
c.
 C
ha
ng
e 
is 
fro
m
 2
00
9Q
4 t
o 2
01
1Q
2.
comment and discussion 377
market recovery across groups. Although both men’s and women’s unem-
ployment rates have improved during the recovery, employment has con-
tinued to decline among women while increasing among men. Labor force 
participation rates for both men and women have continued to decline. 
Examining labor market flows by sex shows that the different experiences 
of men and women in the recovery partly reflect a continuing decline in 
flows from unemployment to employment for women and an improvement 
for men. In short, men have started finding jobs, while women’s job pros-
pects have continued to deteriorate.
The breakdown by education in table 1 shows that employment has fallen 
in the recovery period for all but college-educated workers and that less 
educated workers have suffered bigger declines in labor force participa-
tion. Employment rates have improved for whites during the recovery but 
 continued to decline among minorities. In sum, unlike unemployment rates, 
the changes in the employment-to-population ratios show no evidence that 
the labor market is improving for groups worse hit by the recession. The 
fact reported by the authors—that the groups with the largest increases 
in unemployment during the recession have had relatively larger declines 
in unemployment in the recovery—is driven largely by relatively larger 
declines in labor force participation for these groups.
However, some of the aggregate decline in the  employment-to- population 
ratio in the recovery is a function of changing demographics.  Examining 
employment rates by age shows small increases within each group. How-
ever, the continuing decline in employment for women occurred for all 
women under age 55. Similarly, the employment rate of prime-age blacks—
those aged 25 to 54—fell through the middle of 2011. Moreover, among 
all workers under 55, labor force participation fell in the recovery period 
through 2011Q2. In contrast, participation increased among those over 55. 
Yet the low unemployment rates and rising labor force participation rates 
of older workers hide unique challenges that older unemployed workers 
face in finding jobs. Although they are less likely than younger workers to 
become unemployed, once they do, they have a harder time reentering 
employment.
Median unemployment duration increased from 8.5 weeks in 2007 to 
21.4 weeks in 2011, but underlying this increase is enormous variation by 
age. Unemployed older workers, regardless of education, had the largest 
increase in unemployment duration. Workers of all ages experienced large 
decreases in flows out of unemployment in the early part of the recession, 
but the difference in unemployment duration by age has widened during the 
recovery, through a combination of continued declines in  unemployment 
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outflows for older workers and increasing flows into employment for 
younger unemployed workers. In short, although long-term unemployment 
rates may rise only slightly in the long run, as the authors expect, it is likely 
that older workers will be disproportionately represented among the long-
term unemployed.
the impact oF public sector budget cuts One way in which this recov-
ery differs from previous periods is in the deep cuts to government employ-
ment. These began as the recession was officially ending and have continued 
to the present day. Our figure 1 shows that during most recessions and 
subsequent recoveries, government employment has continued to grow. In 
contrast, government employment stopped growing in the middle of 2008 
and began to decline in early 2009. As of January 2012, total government 
employment had fallen 2.6 percent from its December 2008 level, with 
most of the losses in state and local government, where employment fell 
2.6 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively.
Government employment represents approximately one in six jobs. Thus, 
these large declines in public sector employment are contributing to the 
slow job growth in the recovery both directly, by offsetting gains in the 
Figure 1. payroll employment in the public and private sectors, 1964–2011a
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 private sector, and indirectly, by hampering the recovery in aggregate 
demand. But beyond these aggregate effects, the loss of government jobs 
is hurting some groups more than others. As noted above, women and 
minorities have continued to experience declines in employment during 
the recovery. This partly reflects their disproportionate employment in the 
public sector.
Blacks have been particularly hard hit by the cuts in public sector 
employment: the share of blacks in the CPS reporting employment in the 
public sector fell by 6.0 percent between December 2008 and December 
2011. In contrast, the share of whites employed in the public sector fell by 
4.0 percent over that period. This difference is compounded by the fact that 
blacks are about a third more likely than whites to work in the public sector, 
so the higher rate of job loss applies to a larger share of employed blacks.
Similarly, women are more likely than men to work in the public sector, 
and public sector job losses have been concentrated among female employ-
ees, with teachers and low-wage workers bearing a large share of the cuts. 
For the 3-year period ending in December 2011, data from the Current 
Employment Statistics show a 3.3 percent decline in government jobs held 
by women, compared with a 1.7 percent decline for men. CPS data suggest 
that the job losses were even more concentrated among women: over the 
same period, the share of women reporting employment in the public sector 
fell by 5.6 percent, while that for men was 0.8 percent.
geographic mobility and the Family Finally, one aspect of the labor 
market that deserves greater scrutiny is the challenges that couples face 
when one of them becomes unemployed. As Elsby and his coauthors note in 
this update, there is little evidence of a sharp decline in geographic mobil-
ity in the current recovery; however, geographic mobility is significantly 
lower than it was in the 1982 recession and has been trending downward 
for several decades (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011). One possibility is 
that the increasing contribution of wives’ earnings to household income is 
making it ever more difficult for an unemployed married worker to move 
to take a job opportunity elsewhere. A spouse’s job may cause greater geo-
graphic lock than the troubles in the housing market. One characteristic of 
the labor market in the current recovery is low quit rates, and thus fewer 
employment-to-employment transitions. Given the challenges inherent in 
finding a new job, employed workers may be unwilling or simply unable to 
relocate so that their unemployed spouse can take a job elsewhere. This is 
an area that deserves more research before one can conclude that restricted 
geographic mobility is not contributing to a slower recovery than occurred 
following the 1982 recession.
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In conclusion, Elsby and his coauthors have produced a superb  analysis 
of labor market flows and their implications. It has important ramifica-
tions for how researchers think about the boundaries between labor mar-
ket statuses and labor market flows, and the authors use its insights into 
flow patterns to extrapolate a dynamic by which the unemployment rate—
both short-term and long-term—could be reduced, even in the absence of 
a change to the flow dynamics for the long-term unemployed. However, 
other unique and troubling aspects of the recent recession have emerged 
that may cause lingering labor market difficulties in the long run, espe-
cially for particular demographic groups. In light of worrying postrecession 
employment rates and policy gridlock in the nation’s capital, the prospects 
for a robust labor market recovery remain uncertain.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION   Justin Wolfers recalled that macroecono-
mists had spent much of 2009 wondering whether Okun’s Law had been 
repealed, and much of 2010 wondering the same about the Beveridge curve. 
One thing that this update of the Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin paper showed 
was that those economic relationships were still intact but that the data had 
needed to catch up. Wolfers saw this as a valuable reminder that data are 
always imperfect and that patterns observed in the past tend to persist.
Wolfers also remarked on the finding that the increasing average dura-
tion of unemployment was concentrated among older workers. Although 
some might see this as a bad thing, he suggested that for those who worry 
about hysteresis it might actually be good news. The concern had been that 
the rise in long-term unemployment was concentrated among the youngest 
workers, some of whom might lose any attachment they had to the labor 
force and never work again. To the extent that the rise in long-term unem-
ployment was instead occurring among workers in their late 50s and early 
60s, the possibility of their exit from the labor force implied a smaller loss, 
because they would have retired soon anyway.
Finally, Wolfers was reminded of Robert Hall’s comment during the dis-
cussion of Jesse Rothstein’s paper that proxy responses—that is, persons 
answering questions about other household members—were a potential 
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source of error in the Current Population Survey data. He wondered whether 
some of the difficulty in accurately distinguishing unemployed workers from 
persons outside the labor force might be due in part to such proxying. Wolf-
ers further conjectured that proxy responding might rise during a recession, 
because more household members are likely to be at home when the survey 
worker calls. The solution, he thought, might be to measure employment 
and labor force participation using administrative data instead, whether from 
state unemployment agencies or from the Department of Labor. 
Till von Wachter agreed with Wolfers that it was good news that unem-
ployed youth are finding jobs faster than the average, but he cautioned 
that average unemployment duration was not the only relevant measure. 
Young workers tend to be more willing to take whatever job comes along, 
and their wages are more flexible than those of older workers. Thus, in a 
recession they often take bad jobs at low wages. Of course, they can later 
work their way up to better jobs and higher wages, but that process would 
be slow in a weak economy. Conversely, although workers who become 
unemployed in late middle age suffer smaller lifetime earnings losses than 
younger workers, the cost to society of their joblessness can still be high if 
they start receiving social insurance benefits sooner than they would have 
otherwise.
Also responding to Wolfers, Jesse Rothstein argued that the distinction 
between unemployed and out of the labor force was fundamentally ambig-
uous, and that one did not need to invoke proxy responding to explain the 
fuzziness in the data. In fact, there is no bright line between the two condi-
tions. He offered the following example. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
counts an individual as unemployed if he or she has looked for work in 
the last four weeks. Given that several months might elapse between inter-
views, a respondent might have been unemployed at the first interview and 
be unemployed again at the second, and would be counted as continuously 
unemployed. But suppose that same individual stopped looking for work 
for a four-week spell in between surveys. Then that individual might be 
recorded as not continuously unemployed if the interviews were more fre-
quent. In other words, the same nonemployment history could be recorded 
in different ways depending merely on interview timing. Similarly, Roth-
stein thought, many of those currently being recorded as reentrants into the 
labor force were people who a couple of months earlier were unemployed, 
and it is likely that they think of themselves, quite naturally, as continu-
ously unemployed rather than as reentrants. 
Stephanie Aaronson agreed that there was a gray area consisting of peo-
ple who are available for work and would like to have a job but are not 
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actively looking, and thus are not well captured by the usual definitions. 
Although the CPS had been redesigned in 1994 in an attempt to better cap-
ture these marginal workers, it seemed clear that the CPS was still missing 
them, and missing them in a way that was different from previous cycles.
Laurence Ball asked whether anyone on the Panel could explain, in a 
simple accounting sense, why long-term unemployment had risen so much 
from what it had been in the early 1980s—where were the additional long-
term unemployed coming from? Betsey Stevenson said that part of the 
answer was that more of the long-term unemployed are continuing to look 
for work, and so remain counted as unemployed rather than as exiting 
the labor force, than in the past. Christopher Nekarda added that in past 
decades a much larger share of the unemployed were on temporary layoff, 
and thus more likely to be recalled to their jobs before their unemploy-
ment spells became prolonged. Robert Gordon offered a third explanation, 
namely, that the recovery from the early-1980s recession had been rapid, 
shortening the average employment spell; in contrast, today’s very slow 
recovery is causing many employment spells to drag on. 
Following up on the discussion of Okun’s Law, Gordon also offered an 
update of his own analysis. Okun’s Law predicts that a cyclical decline in 
output will be divided in a two-to-one ratio between a reduction in hours 
and a reduction in productivity. The actual relationship over the postwar 
period up to the mid-1980s was about three to one. Since then, however, 
reductions in hours have more than fully accounted for cyclical declines 
in output, leaving no role for procyclical productivity fluctuations. Given 
that change in the relationship, the weakness of the current labor market 
recovery was no puzzle: the hours gap, at 8 percent, was the same as the 
output gap. The output gap had hardly narrowed at all in the last 2 years, 
and therefore, unsurprisingly, neither had the hours gap.
Simon Gilchrist addressed the impact of the housing collapse on labor 
markets. He found the available evidence fairly persuasive that the decline 
in housing prices had not increased unemployment by making workers less 
mobile, stuck in homes that they could not sell for enough to cover their 
mortgage obligations. He speculated, however, that the housing debacle 
might have had adverse wealth effects that in turn affected labor market deci-
sions: for example, older workers who had counted on using their homes to 
fund an early retirement might now be choosing to stay in the labor force and 
be looking for jobs. One could test that hypothesis by comparing geographic 
regions to see whether those with the largest housing price declines tended to 
have a larger increase in the share of older unemployed workers.
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Responding to the discussion, Ays¸egül S¸ahin agreed with Stevenson that 
the popular characterization of the recent recession as a “mancession” was 
factually incorrect. Moreover, in the aftermath of the recession, women 
were faring less well than men, both overall and within industries. She 
saw several possible explanations for this, all of them speculative. The first 
started from the fact that, within sectors, some occupations are dominated 
by men and others by women: it could be that the male-dominated occupa-
tions lost jobs disproportionately during the recession and are regaining 
them disproportionately now. Another possibility, which Mark Aguiar and 
Erik Hurst had investigated, was that men are more likely to invest in job 
training while unemployed, whereas women are more likely to engage in 
home production instead, and this discrepancy could give men an advan-
tage in the job market during a recovery. Finally, it could be that men are 
more flexible about work schedules—that is, more willing to accept a job 
that involves other than a 40-hour, 9-to-5 workweek—and that this leads to 
their being rehired more rapidly than women.
In reply to Wolfers, S¸ahin agreed that the Beveridge curve was alive 
and well. She noted, however, that the curve seemed to have rotated coun-
terclockwise, as predicted by the Mortensen-Pissarides model. She also 
agreed with Rothstein and the other discussants that the distinction between 
unemployment and nonparticipation was ambiguous and that the BLS’s 
definition of marginal attachment was not adequately capturing workers 
on the sidelines. Clearly some improvement was needed on these measure-
ment issues, given recent proposals to make certain policies conditional on 
a given unemployment rate.
S¸ahin also offered two additional possible explanations, both of which 
are mentioned in the literature, for why long-term unemployment has 
increased since the 1980s. One of these was a compositional effect related 
to von Wachter’s point about younger unemployed workers being quicker 
to take the first job offered: the implication was that older workers tend to 
have higher unemployment durations, and given that the workforce today 
is older on average than that of the 1980s, that could contribute to higher 
long-term unemployment today. The second possibility stemmed from the 
increase in wage inequality: the rising differences in wages across differ-
ent jobs might prompt unemployed workers to prolong their job search in 
the hope of finding a much better paying job than what was immediately 
on offer.
Finally, replying to Gilchrist, S¸ahin said her understanding was that 
most studies did find that negative housing equity reduced the mobility 
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of some workers, but on the other hand, those whose homes had already 
been foreclosed on experienced increased mobility, so that the two 
effects tended to cancel each other out. She cited work by Raven Mol-
loy, Abigail Wozniak, and Christopher Smith that had found very simi-
lar effects on mobility across different states with different home price 
movements.
